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Abstract: In this paper I develop and 
defend a form of argumentative nor-
mativity that is not based on funda-
mental principles. I first argue that 
research agendas that aim to discover 
(or claimed to have discovered) fun-
damental principles of ‘good’ argu-
mentative discourse share one crucial 
weak spot, viz. circularity. I then 
argue that this weak spot can be 
avoided in a pancritical (Bartley, 
1984) view of normativity. 
 
Résumé: Dans cet article, je déve-
loppe et défends une forme de nor-
mativité argumentative qui ne repose 
pas sur des principes fondamentaux. 
Je soutiens d'abord que les pro-
grammes de recherche qui visent à 
découvrir (ou qui prétendent avoir 
découvert) les principes de «bon» 
discours partagent un point faible, la 
circularité. Ensuite je soutiens qu’on 
peut éviter ce point faible en adop-
tant un point de vue désengagé des 
idéaux de l’argumentation. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The assumption that some forms of argumentative discourse 
contravene established standards lies at the basis of many nor-
mative theories of argumentative discourse. Whether the stand-
ards are presented as standards of cognition, of communicative 
behavior or of logic, the basic spur is the same, and it might be 
roughly formulated as: Not anything goes!  
 It has been part of the explicit or implicit research agenda 
of the normatively oriented argumentation scholar to discover 
and formulate the standards that separate the “good” (rational, 
reasonable etc.) from the “bad” (fallacious, irrational, unreason-
able etc.) in argumentative reality. Since the search for standards 
assumes the standards’ existence and discoverability, such an 
agenda can be characterized as being idealist. For example, 
Johnson and Blair (1987) define informal logic as a “branch of 
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logic whose task is to develop non-formal2 standards, criteria, 
procedures for the analysis, interpretation, evaluation, critique 
and construction of argumentation in everyday language” (p. 
148). Similarly, Johnson (2000) notes: “The goodness I am after 
consists in those qualities that are necessary for the argument to 
achieve the goal of rational persuasion” (p. 189). Van Eemeren 
and Grootendorst (1984; 2004) also regard the normative en-
deavor as a quest for norms, more precisely those “norms of 
reasonableness” that good argumentative discourse “must satis-
fy” (2004, p. 10). It is this quest for rules, norms, criteria, or 
qualities that typifies the idealist research agenda in argumenta-
tion theory. 
 The step from the assumption that not anything goes to the 
idea that argumentative reality could and should be tamed by 
means of standards is a crucial one and it deserves more atten-
tion. The central aim of the present paper is to reexamine this 
step. In view of this reexamination, I will attempt to outline a 
form of normativity that maintains the basic assumption that not 
anything goes yet declines the need of pre-defined norms, rules, 
criteria or any other kind of normative pronouncements.  
 The present paper can be seen as an elaborate follow-up 
on a brief remark made by Govier at the end of her essay “What 
is a good argument?” (1992). Having examined various norma-
tive accounts, Govier remarks: “we are so far from having an 
account of argument cogency which is reasonable, reliable, and 
efficient that we may have to re-examine the quest itself” (p. 
409, emphasis added). How can the quest itself be reexamined? 
Are there other ways to respond to the not-anything-goes as-
sumption? Can we even speak of normativity and criticism 
without a solid system of standards beneath our feet? If so, what 
kind of ‘criticism’ would that be and what force would it carry? 
The present paper aims to approach these questions and, as such, 
Govier’s suggestion.  
 Since the discussion risks being overly abstract, it seems 
better to start with a more detailed example of an idealist agenda 
and take it as a case in point. In section 2, I outline the norma-
tive agenda as it is pursued in the pragma-dialectical theory of 
argumentation. In section 3, I defend the claim that idealist 
agendas, to the extent that they are built around a set of funda-
mental principles (rules, norms, criteria etc.) lead to circularity. 
In section 4, I outline a type of normativity that is not based on 
fundamental principles. For reasons that will be explained in due 
course, I refer to this following Bartley (1984) as pancritical 
normativity. I conclude in section 5 by explaining the place and 
function of the concept of “fallacy” in a pancritical normative 
agenda. 
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2.  Idealist agendas—a case in point 
 
The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation is one of the 
most developed theories built around an ideal of good (“reason-
able”) argumentative discourse. It is for this reason a very ap-
propriate candidate for the purpose of this essay.  
 The ideal of reasonableness in pragma-dialectics is ex-
pressed in the form of a set of rules for a critical discussion (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 131). Any real-life form of 
argumentative discourse that is in accordance with these rules is 
reasonable by the pragma-dialectical standards; argumentative 
discourse that goes against these rules is deemed fallacious (van 
Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2007, p. 63). The evaluation of a con-
crete instance of argumentative discourse consists of a compari-
son between the discourse under examination (to be more exact: 
a reconstructed version of the discourse under examination) and 
the rules for a critical discussion. Let me illustrate this compari-
son by with the help of an example. Consider the following ex-
cerpt that appeared in the concluding section of one of Daniel 
Dennett’s texts on the subject of Darwin’s theory of evolution 
(Dennett, 2013, p. 276). 
 
This perspective [Darwin’s theory of evolution] is so 
widely unifying and at the same time so generous with 
detailed insights that one might say it’s a power tool, all 
on its own. Those who are still strangely repelled by 
Darwinian thinking must consider the likelihood that if 
they try to go it alone with only the hand tools of tradi-
tion, they will find themselves laboring far from the cut-
ting edge of research on important phenomena as diverse 
as epidemics and epistemology, biofuels and brain archi-
tecture, molecular genetics, music, and morality. 
(Dennett, 2013, p. 276) 
 
A pragma-dialectical evaluation of this particular piece of argu-
mentative discourse would proceed roughly as follows. The ex-
aminer begins by analyzing the excerpt based on the analytical 
model of a critical discussion. In the example above, the differ-
ence of opinion presumably concerns the acceptability of Dar-
winism: Dennett acts in favor of it, while, we may assume, some 
other scholars reject it. A full-fledged reconstruction of Den-
nett’s position and his discussion moves in this resolution pro-
cess would take into consideration the situation in which the 
stretch of discourse was produced and would thereby place the 
quoted remarks into a larger institutional context. This more or 
less complex analysis would then produce an “analytic over-
view” of Dennett’s argumentative behavior (van Eemeren & 
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Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 118-122). The analytic overview is then 
taken as a basis for proceeding to the evaluation of Dennett’s 
argumentative behavior. 
 In order to carry out an evaluation, the pragma-dialectician 
must make two very important decisions. First, she must choose 
to carry out the evaluation on the basis of a specific ideal, viz. 
the ideal of a critical discussion. I will refer to this as the prima-
ry normative decision. Second, she must choose a set of condi-
tions that specify, in the context at hand, what needs to be the 
case in order for the evaluator to decide that a rule has been vio-
lated. These latter are referred to as “soundness conditions” (van 
Eemeren, 2010, p. 202). I will refer to this as the secondary 
normative decision.  
In the case of Dennett’s acts, the pragma-dialectician 
will, let us imagine, find two points of focus: (1) Dennett’s de-
scription of those who oppose Darwinism as being “strangely 
repelled by Darwinian thinking” and (2) Dennett’s claim that 
scholars who reject Darwinian thinking “will find themselves 
laboring far from the cutting edge of research.” A relevant dia-
lectical rule that might apply to both acts is Rule 1 of the code of 
conduct, the so-called Freedom Rule: “Parties must not prevent 
each other from advancing standpoints and casting doubt upon 
standpoints” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208). On 
the surface, (1) looks very much like an ad hominem, the fallacy 
by means of which a discussant portrays the opponent as being 
unworthy of participating in the argumentative discussion, while 
(2) seems like a candidate for an ad baculum, the fallacy of try-
ing to prevent the other party from doubting a standpoint be-
cause of negative consequences that are connected with this re-
jection.  
Having selected the rule, and having surmised the possi-
ble rule violations, the evaluator proceeds to the secondary nor-
mative decision and asks: Concerning (1), under what conditions 
is characterizing a fellow scholar as being “strangely repelled” 
by one’s own view (Darwinism) a reasonable form of argumen-
tative behavior and are these conditions fulfilled in the case at 
hand? Concerning (2), under what conditions is the mentioning 
of futile scholarship reasonable and are these conditions fulfilled 
in the case at hand? The answer to these questions will be given 
based on a set of soundness conditions. These will allow an 
evaluator to decide, in case of (1) and (2), whether the ideal of 
reasonableness has been observed or violated. These soundness 
conditions form “the theoretical basis for formulating systematic 
and workable criteria for determining whether the norms of rea-
sonableness incorporated in the rules for critical discussion have 
been satisfied” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 268). It is thus by com-
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paring (the reconstructed version of) Dennett’s discourse in (1) 
and (2) with the soundness conditions that apply in this context 
that the judgment of reasonableness will be made.  
 For the present purposes, we can leave aside the actual 
result of the evaluation of Dennett’s discourse. Important in the 
just-outlined procedure are the two normative decisions. Any 
theory that develops its normative agenda around a set of fun-
damental principles will have to make these normative decisions 
in one way or another. The evaluator must decide to work with a 
certain ideal and must decide in which way the ideal is to be 
implemented.  
 
 
3.  Circularity in idealist agendas 
 
The idealist needs to vindicate the primary and the secondary 
normative decisions because, unless these decisions are in some 
way separated from the scholar’s personal convictions, the 
whole idea of normativity seems to turn into an endless discus-
sion about incompatible personal attachments. By vindicating 
these decisions, the scholar elevates her normative pronounce-
ments from “Some people think … is reasonable” or “I think … 
is unreasonable” to pronouncements of the form “… is unrea-
sonable.” This elevation presents no particular problems in eve-
ryday life. A set of rules is given the status of summum bonum 
because the state, the judge, the doctor, the parent etc. enjoys the 
authority to stipulate them into place. The academic, however, 
enjoys no such authority. Her pronouncements must be elevated 
in some other way. How does this elevation take place?  
 In the absence of authority, the two normative decisions 
are vindicated through methodological criteria. The decisions 
are vindicated by showing that they are in accordance with a set 
of criteria that separate ‘good’ evaluation methods from “bad” 
ones (or the “better” ones from the “worse”). I will illustrate 
this, first, with regard to the primary normative decision. 
 Pragma-dialecticians have vindicated the primary norma-
tive decision by showing that the rules fulfill the criterion of 
problem (solving) validity. The criterion of problem validity 
measures rules’ capability to solve a set of problems and thus 
their “capability to ‘do the job’ they are designed to do” (van 
Eemeren, 2010, p. 32). It must be briefly mentioned that the 
criterion of problem-validity is usually accompanied by another 
criterion, the criterion of intersubjective validity. This latter cri-
terion measures the rules’ alignment with what language users 
regard as reasonable argumentative behavior (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 2004, p. 132; van Eemeren, 2010, p. 32). Howev-
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er, intersubjective validity can be left aside for the present pur-
poses since it is not presented as a sine qua non criterion. As van 
Eemeren, Meuffels and Verburg note: “The soundness of the 
pragma-dialectical rules is first and foremost based on their 
problem validity” (2000, p. 418). Similarly, van Eemeren, Gars-
sen and Meuffels note: “If the respondents in our studies prove 
to apply norms that diverge from the pragma-dialectical discus-
sion rules [i.e., if the rules turn out not to be inter-subjectively 
valid], it cannot be deduced that the theory is wrong” (2009, p. 
27).  
 Focusing thus on the criterion of problem-validity, I want 
to argue that its use gives rise to circularity. This circularity be-
comes apparent if we look more closely at the problems whose 
resolution conferred the pragma-dialectical rules their problem 
validity. Notice that these problems must have been specified in 
advance, given that the rules were “designed” (van Eemeren, 
2010, p. 32) to solve these problems. If a test consists of seeing 
whether an object can “do a job,” the job must be specified in 
advance.  
 And yet, the problems solved by the pragma-dialectical 
rules come into sight only as negations of the rules themselves. 
In other words, the “problematic” character of the situations in 
which the rules are violated seems to consist of the fact that the 
rules are being violated. It is essential in this regard to note that 
the criterion of problem validity does not measure the rules’ 
capability of bringing about resolutions of differences of opinion 
simpliciter. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst explain, “the 
rules cannot offer any guarantee that discussants who abide by 
these rules will always be able to resolve their differences of 
opinion” (2004, p. 134). Rather, the criterion measures the rules’ 
capability of bringing about resolutions that are up to standards. 
We are told for instance that unless a certain rule is followed, 
the difference of opinion is not “truly resolved” (van Eemeren et 
al., 2014, p. 542) or that if another rule is not followed, the reso-
lution would not proceed “in an adequate fashion” (van Eeme-
ren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 134). Here are some other exam-
ples: 
 
It is only when a dispute has fully come to light that it be-
comes possible to make systematic attempts at resolving 
it. 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 107, emphasis 
added) 
 
If a shift takes place in the proposition with respect to 
which standpoints are advanced, doubt is expressed and 
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attacks and defenses are carried out, the discussion can, 
at best, lead to a spurious resolution. 
(1992, p. 125, emphasis added) 
 
The fallacy committed by using nonargumentative means 
of persuasion is that a real resolution of the dispute is 
prevented. 
(1992, p. 133, emphasis added) 
 
Importantly, these last three excerpts are taken from Argumenta-
tion, Communication and Fallacies, the work in which “the au-
thors established the problem validity of the pragma-dialectical 
discussion procedure” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 32). In more re-
cent works, references have been made uniform and the expres-
sion “on the merits” is used to refer to these up-to-standards 
resolutions (van Eemeren, Meuffels & Garssen, 2009, p. 27; van 
Eemeren, 2010, p. 1; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 542). It be-
comes clear that the rules and the problems are two sides of the 
same coin when van Eemeren et al. (2014) explain that the ex-
pressions ‘on the merits’ and ‘reasonably’ are coextensive: re-
solving differences of opinion on the merits “is exactly what 
‘resolving in a reasonable way’ in pragma-dialectics means” (p. 
595).  
 But if the problems and the rules are two sides of the same 
coin, we are effectively back to square one. The test passed by 
the rules appears to be that of safeguarding “real,” “adequate,” 
“systematic,” “non-spurious,” “on the merits” resolutions of 
differences of opinion. But since such terms were never sepa-
rately defined, and since in the exceptional situation when they 
were defined the authors pointed back to the same ideal whose 
status is at issue (the case of “on the merits”), one can conclude 
that the rules came to solve problems they could not have failed 
to solve. Put differently, the criterion of problem-validity is cir-
cularly defined as the rules’ capability to prevent unreasonable 
argumentative behavior in an approach where unreasonableness 
is understood as violations of the very rules whose status is at 
issue. 
In other works, a way out of this circularity is suggested 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1987; 1994). The authors claim 
to have indicated “precisely which classical fallacies can be con-
trolled through these rules” and go on to explain that “methodi-
cally speaking, this seems to us the best test to the problem-
validity of the dialectical system of rules presented” (van Eeme-
ren & Grootendorst, 1994, p. 23). According to this interpreta-
tion of the problem-validity criterion, the history of argumenta-
tion theory brings a set of “classical fallacies” to the theorist and 
the theorist undertakes to develop rules for resolving those tradi-
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tional fallacies, now identified as problems. The circularity is 
thereby broken since the traditional fallacies obviously existed 
before the pragma-dialectical rules.    
However, the tradition famously failed to deliver a clear 
set of problems and pragma-dialecticians were among the pio-
neers in argumentation theory to note this failure and try alterna-
tive routes. As many authors have observed, the pragma-
dialectical theory has many advantages over other approaches to 
fallacies (e.g., Hitchcock, 2006). But such advantages derive 
precisely from the theory’s claim to present, in the authors’ own 
words, an “alternative” to other approaches (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1992, p. 104). This alternative was created 
through a three-fold redefinition. First, the concept of fallacy 
was redefined:  
 
In our pragma-dialectical conception, the term ‘fallacy’ is 
reserved for speech acts which hinder in any way the res-
olution of a dispute in a critical discussion. Thus this 
term is systematically connected with the rules for critical 
discussions, and our treatment of fallacies is linked to a 
particular theoretical approach to argumentation. 
(van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1987, p. 284) 
 
Second, labels of fallacies that already existed in the Standard 
Treatment were also redefined, e.g., petitio principii was rede-
fined in terms of the pragma-dialectical concept of ‘material 
starting point’ (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 153). 
And third, new fallacies were defined, e.g., the fallacy of declar-
ing a standpoint sacrosanct (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
1992, p. 216). These redefinitions confer the theory an increase 
in systematicity and, as such, notable advantages over other the-
ories. But whatever connection remained between the problems 
identified by pragma-dialecticians and the ones that worried 
Aristotle and his followers, it is all but irrelevant for the rules’ 
problem validity. In fact, van Eemeren and Grootendorst stress 
explicitly that if  “one or more of the traditionally listed fallacies 
could not be analyzed pragma-dialectically, this would not au-
tomatically mean that there is something wrong with the theoret-
ical apparatus. It would be a mistake to treat the traditional list 
as a sacrosanct gift from heaven” (1992, p. 105, emphasis add-
ed). In the same vein, Grootendorst criticized “buttercup ap-
proaches” to fallacies for disregarding the fact that “fallacy is a 
theory dependent concept” (1987, p. 335).  
 If problem-validity had been understood as the capability 
to eliminate a concrete set of predefined (“classical”) fallacies, 
the circularity would have indeed been avoided. But this is not 
how problem-validity was eventually conceptualized, nor, prac-
   Eugen Octav Popa 
 
 
© Eugen Octav Popa. Informal Logic, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2016), pp. 192-216. 
200
tically speaking, how it could have been conceptualized, given, 
first, the aforementioned three-fold redefinition and, second, the 
plurality of not always compatible and coherent approaches that 
made up “classic” fallacy theory from Aristotle to the Woods-
Walton studies.  
 In sum, although the pragma-dialectical rules are problem-
valid, the criterion of problem validity is circular because the 
“problematic” character of the prohibited forms of behavior is 
only spelled out as the negation of the very rules whose status is 
at issue. Put differently, the unreasonableness of a fallacy does 
not derive from the fact that it hinders the resolution of a differ-
ence of opinion; rather, its unreasonableness derives from the 
fact that it hinders the resolution of a difference of opinion on 
the merits, where these merits are identified with the pragma-
dialectical rules. The unreasonableness of a rule-violating act 
derives from its violating the rules.  
 The discussion of the circularity involved in vindicating 
the primary normative decision applies, mutatis mutandis, to the 
vindication of the secondary normative decision. I will go into it 
more briefly. As explained, the secondary normative decision is 
the choice for a set of soundness conditions for applying a se-
lected rule in a concrete institutional context. Say we want to 
apply the following rule from the pragma-dialectical code of 
conduct (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208):  
 
Rule 1: Parties may not prevent each other from advanc-
ing standpoints or casting doubt upon standpoints 
 
The crux of this rule is the term ‘prevent.’ In evaluating, the 
scholar must ask: What does it mean for a discussant to “pre-
vent” her collocutor from putting forward standpoint or doubt? 
In order to answer such a question one needs a soundness condi-
tion. This will take the form of a new statement that contains a 
new rule for separating actual acts of prevention from apparent 
ones. Say we formulate the following soundness condition for 
an imaginary institutional context:  
 
Soundness condition for the application of Rule 1 in context 
C: An act counts as ‘preventing the other party from putting 
forward standpoint or doubt’ if it amounts to a characteriza-
tion of the other party as being unworthy of participating in 
the discussion. 
 
Now the category “a characterization of the other party as being 
unworthy” is a newly introduced category. A new form of set-
membership becomes at issue. The analyst now asks: Under 
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what conditions do I properly apply the label “characterizing 
someone as being unworthy”? But this raises the need for a new 
criterion, a criterion for the application of the above-given 
soundness condition. This criterion will be added to the ones 
already under discussion. This is what Popper described as a 
snowball effect: “with every single step you take, the need for 
further steps increases in snowball-like fashion” (Popper, 
1963/2002, p. 29).  
 Of course, the evaluator cannot afford this ad infinitum 
proliferation of criteria or else the normative judgment is never 
produced. Also, stopping this proliferation cannot be arbitrary—
she cannot decide to stop after a random number of set-
memberships have been dealt with. The only way the secondary 
normative decision can be made is through a circular movement. 
The choice for a certain soundness condition (i.e., the secondary 
normative decision) can only be vindicated by pointing out that 
the thus-specified rule identifies unreasonable behavior, where 
‘unreasonableness’ is again understood as violation of the thus-
specified rule whose application is at issue. The evaluator must 
substitute terms salva rationem, so that reasonableness is pre-
served, without any independent and indisputable criterion for 
checking whether the substitution preserves reasonableness. 
Circularity is the only way in which the need for new criteria is 
brought to a halt. 
 This kind of circularity does not surface in textbook treat-
ments of “bad” argumentative discourse. In such treatments, 
scholars typically take the second course, i.e., stop at an arbi-
trary point. For example, both Walton (2006) and Tindale 
(2007) set out to devise evaluation methods under the aegis of 
methodology. They both present lists of categories of fallacies 
and exemplify the identification of fallacies in one or two cases 
per each category. Yet this only goes so far. We learn, for ex-
ample, that there are ad populum arguments, which are defined 
as “illicit” appeals to popularity (Tindale, 2007, p. 105). Popu-
larity in itself is not bad, but we “need to consider carefully what 
grounds the popularity and how it is related to what is being 
claimed” (p. 105). However, in view of the self-imposed goal of 
teaching the student “how to identify fallacies” (p. 13), the dis-
cussion ends disappointingly soon. The identification of each 
fallacy turns out to depend on the answering of one or more crit-
ical questions. For the ad populum, these are: 
 
1. Is the appeal to a popular belief or practice so widely 
known to be correct that the burden of proof would lie 
with anyone who questioned it? 
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2. If not, and the burden lies with the arguer, has the pop-
ularity been adequately supported or explained (by a 
poll, for example)? 
3. Is the popularity relevant to the claim made in the con-
clusion? 
(Tindale, 2007, p. 108, emphasis added) 
 
How will the student know whether the italicized terms are 
properly applied to a case under consideration? Or, to put it dif-
ferently, how can the teacher using Tindale’s textbook check 
whether the student has indeed learned “to identify fallacies”? 
The teacher presumably needs some measurement. Yet no such 
measurement is given. Having been acquainted with a set of 
critical questions and with some examples, the student is invited 
to generalize the application of the italicized categories and it’s 
criteria all the way down. 
   
 
4.  A pancritical view of criticism 
 
In this section I want to present an alternative to idealist norma-
tive agendas. If criticism understood as comparison with an ide-
al engenders circularity in the way the previous section has ar-
gued, then Govier’s remark that “the quest itself” needs to be 
reexamined is as pertinent as ever.  
 The idea that one can be critical without fundamental 
principles is anything but new. Its locus classicus remains Bart-
ley (1984), from which I borrow the term “pancritical” for the 
present purposes. In his treatise, Bartley makes a compelling 
case for the strong claim that commitment to a particular norma-
tive ideal leads to a “crisis of integrity” (p. 7). This crisis of in-
tegrity arises from the fact that the normatively oriented scholar 
is actively critical with regard to other individuals’ acts, goals, 
and deeds yet regards his own ideal as a matter “ultimate [i.e., 
uncriticised] commitment” (p. 71). This ultimate commitment is 
in fact a free pass for an endless use of tu quoque arguments in 
which one scholar holding an ultimate commitment responds to 
critique by reminding the critic that “people who live in glass 
houses should not throw stones” (p. 78), that is, by reminding 
the critic about her own commitment to the ideal on the basis of 
which the critique was advanced.  
 In order to escape this situation, the idea of criticism must 
be revamped. Bartley warns that such a shift must not be “just 
another refrain of the song, ‘You must be critical’, which has 
been in the philosophical litany from the pre-Socratics to Socra-
tes himself, through Descartes and Kant, to Nietzsche, to the 
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latest enthusiastic student of philosophy” (p. 113). As an alter-
native to this “old story” (p. 113), Bartley proposes to abandon 
the idea that criticism needs to come in the form of a compari-
son with a “rational criterion or authority” (p. 115). In a pancrit-
ical environment, the critic cannot carry out such a comparison 
for she is “committed, attached, addicted, to no position” (1984, 
p. 118).  
 The very idea of lack of commitment can perhaps be mis-
taken for an irresponsible and unqualified ‘anything-goes’ atti-
tude. Indeed, terms such as “eclecticism” (Lakatos, 1970), “da-
daism” (Feyerabend, 1993), and “disorder” (Dupré, 1993), while 
positively or at least neutrally intended, are often associated 
with some man-against-man situation in which nothing matters. 
As the studies of Kekes (1993) and Lassman (2011) have 
shown, the concept of “value pluralism” has had precisely such 
a faith in moral and political philosophy.  
Yet the absence of fundamental principles need not mean 
abandoning the normative project. It just means approaching it 
in a different way. For the purposes of this essay, and with the 
risk of some oversimplification, the pancritical agenda can be 
reduced to the following three theses. 
 
(i) The critic regards all ideals of ‘good’ argumentative dis-
course as traditions of equal value. None is a summum 
bonum and no scholar has privileged access to an Archi-
medean point from which other traditions can be judged.  
  
A pancritical research agenda in argumentation theory will be 
fundamentally different from the quest for ideals discussed in 
§2-3. To the pancritical scholar, the many ideals out there, with-
in argumentation theory and in other institutional contexts, are 
traditions of equal value. These traditions are formed naturally 
in contexts where individuals need to coordinate their argumen-
tative behavior (e.g. courts of law). They are all “ethno-
methods,” to revive Garfinkel’s term, in which circularity is 
inescapable. The question of whether Reason (the ideal) should 
model or should be modeled by Practice (the argumentative real-
ity) vanishes once their “mutual involvement” is brought to sur-
face (Albert, 1985, p. 102). For “even the most perfect standards 
or rules are not independent of the material on which they act” 
and “even the most disorderly practice is not without its regular-
ities” and, as such, we are brought to conclude that “what we 
call ‘reason’ and ‘practice’ are […] two different kind of prac-
tices” (Feyerabend, 1978, p. 26).  
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(ii) There are two ways in which one can be said to “criti-
cize”: either by making a comparison between the tradi-
tion under investigation and one’s own tradition or by 
finding anomalies in one and the same tradition. The pan-
critical agenda seeks to develop the second. 
 
The pancritical critic works (not with) but on principles of 
“good” argumentative discourse. She shares with the idealist the 
quest for ideals, yet she undertakes this with anthropological, 
rather than methodological, verve. The pancritical scholar seeks 
ideals of good argumentation because of her self-imposed task 
to find anomalies and internal inconsistencies that have in the 
past been kept at arm’s length by the traditions’ self-defense 
mechanism. In looking for anomalies, the pancritical scholar 
highlights problems that can be employed as a point of departure 
for improving the tradition in question, for any anomaly sug-
gests the possibility of an alternative account. Those interested 
in maintaining that tradition can follow this suggestion and 
“process” the anomaly.  
 Yet, in a more fundamental sense, the pancritical critic is 
just being true to form. Because, in looking for anomalies, she is 
effectively looking for anomalies and internal inconsistency in 
her own agenda. Should she discover an ideal that is beyond 
critique, an ideal which is perfectly coherent and for which no 
anomaly can ever be discovered or imagined, she must admit 
defeat and acknowledge that, as far as that particular ideal is 
concerned, (i) has been refuted. 
  
(iii) There is neither a pre-defined definition of anomaly, nor 
any pre-defined method for finding anomalies or checking 
“objectively” whether some discovery constitutes an 
anomaly. One must judge on a case-by-case basis.  
 
Albert refers to the intellectual exercise of the critic as the 
“search for contradiction” (1985, p. 54) and as “thinking in al-
ternatives” (p. 66). Feyerabend adds that it involves a form of 
“backward movement” (1993, p. 114) to an earlier stage in the 
development of the tradition under study and that “one way of 
criticizing standards is to do research that violates them” (1978, 
p. 39). For Bartley, it is the asking of the question “Under what 
conditions would this theory be false?” (1984, p. 176). Such 
remarks are perhaps inspiring, but they overfly the main point, 
which is this: the pancritical exercise is an exercise of imagina-
tion and it is completely context-dependent. There is no hope of 
specifying in advance what counts as an anomaly simply be-
cause there is no pre-defined situation in which the proponents 
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of a certain tradition decide to abandon one tradition and em-
brace another one. The only advice one can give is the anti-
advice to improvise—i.e., to take no advice too seriously. One is 
thereby encouraged to mix and match, fluctuate, reinterpret, 
ridicule, rearrange, shuffle, magnify, play down, change focus, 
forget, exaggerate and redo. And there is no guarantee that ei-
ther of these would work until you notice that it does work. 
 Unlike the idealist critic, who can determine the correct-
ness of the critique within the confines of her own tradition, the 
pancritical critic is in a very disadvantageous position. The suc-
cess of her endeavors is determined by those who participate in 
a certain tradition. Namely, she must attempt to convince those 
involved in a certain tradition to not only accept a situation as 
anomalous, but to accept it as an anomaly worth corroborating 
(to accept it as a signal of crisis, to use Kuhn’s terminology). 
This is an unfavorable position not because those involved in 
that tradition have psychological and institutional reasons to 
keep the tradition unchanged (although this might at times play 
a role), but because the tradition itself will typically have in-
built mechanisms for keeping anomalies at bay. This is what 
Lakatos referred to as the “protective belt” of research pro-
grams, viz. the set of auxiliary hypotheses that shield the “hard 
core” of that program from crisis (1970, p. 133). Without being 
unfair or ad hoc, without being what Popper called “convention-
alist stratagems” (Popper, 1935/2002, p. 61), these auxiliary 
hypotheses do make the life of a critic harder. As Albert put it, 
such claims, which are typically developed in anticipation rather 
than in response to critique, give “the prevailing theoretical con-
ception such an advantage over other possible—and possibly 
still undeveloped alternatives that they are scarcely considered 
as rivals” (Albert, 1985, p. 66). This “tenacity” (Lakatos, 1970, 
p. 102) of a research program is not a blemish or a form of irra-
tionality; it is a natural consequence of the scholar’s decision to 
work within a certain tradition. The same conclusion is reached 
by Feyerabend (1993) who, after a detailed study of the dispute 
between Galileo and his contemporaries, notes that “while the 
pre-Copernican astronomy was in trouble (was confronted by a 
series of refuting instances and implausibilities), the Copernican 
theory was in even greater trouble (was confronted by even 
more drastic refuting instances and implausibilities)” (1993, p. 
105, italics in original). 
Applying this to the situation at hand, we see that if 
evaluation is understood as comparison with an ideal, the ideal 
itself cannot be constantly under discussion. To a considerable 
extent, then, the success of the idealist’s project depends on her 
securing the “tenacity” of the ideal. This places the pancritical 
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critic in a particularly unfavorable position for she must criticize 
the ideal as a whole, viz., its hard core together with its protec-
tive belt. I will illustrate this in the following section. Before I 
proceed to this illustration, I want to deal with two possible ob-
jections. 
 First, one might still feel the need to have something solid 
below one’s feet and reply that there is no basis on which the 
pancritical evaluator develops her critique. The lack of basis in 
the sense of a pre-defined criterion is indeed, as explained, a 
feature of the pancritical criticism. But in the way this reply is 
typically formulated it suggests that the criticism is thereby not 
worthy of being taken into consideration. This reply subtly 
brings to the table the assumption that change (institutional 
change, including, but not restricted to, academic change) is 
only worthwhile if it is compatible with, principles that are al-
ready in place. The reply is thus a veiled way of asking “OK, but 
what reasons do I have to agree with the critique?” If pressed, 
the pancritical critic must admit that no such reasons can be giv-
en. Nevertheless, while erratic in an assumed way, the criticism 
might in fact carry more weight due precisely to its lack of posi-
tioning. In any case, the “You have your Archimedes’ lever, I 
have mine” is not a way out for the proponent of the criticized 
tradition. Thus, while strictly speaking baseless, pancritical cri-
tique might in fact be more effective and more easily adopted by 
those committed to certain paradigms since, again, anomalies 
are indirect promises that a certain tradition can be improved. 
 Second, one might reply that the commitment to ideal is 
just replaced with a commitment to the tenets (i), (ii) and (iii), or 
a more developed version thereof. This reply is tantamount to 
saying that the pancritical critic is just as committed to her pan-
critical style of normativity as the idealist is to hers. As in the 
first case, this reply correctly identifies a feature of the pancriti-
cal style of normativity: there is commitment involved in both 
the pancritical and the idealist agendas. However, the tu quoque 
does not hold any more, unless one glaringly equivocates on the 
term ‘commitment.’ The idealist is committed to a certain ideal 
of argumentative discourse; the pancritical critic is committed to 
avoiding commitment regarding particular ideals of argumenta-
tive discourse. The word ‘commitment’ can be perhaps used for 
both sentences, but it hardly means the same. The two agendas 
are both identifiable as normative agendas and as such involve a 
commitment to the not-anything-goes assumption, how the issue 
is managed from that point onwards is crucial. This second reply 
is a bit like accusing the person who is not addicted to any sub-
stances that she is addicted to her lack of addiction. The crucial 
difference is that the idealist critic cannot carry out her norma-
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tive tasks without a set of pre-defined principles; the pancritical 
critic can (and must).  
 
 
5.  A brief illustration 
 
The outline given in the previous section can be clarified by 
means of a brief illustration. Since I have already introduced it 
above, I will employ Rule 1 of the pragma-dialectical code of 
conduct as a case in point. According to this rule it is unreason-
able to “prevent” the other party “from advancing standpoints or 
casting doubt upon standpoints.” The first question to ask is: 
What counts as an anomaly in this case?  
 Roughly speaking, an anomaly in this case would be a 
situation in which an obvious violation of Rule 1 is not obvious-
ly unreasonable—or, worse, it is obviously reasonable. Notice 
that the pragma-dialectician cannot really reject such observa-
tions as impossible on principle. She cannot say: “What you 
want to discover cannot exist since I define reasonableness pre-
cisely as alignment with the rules.” Such a reply would mean 
that reasonableness is solely a matter of definition and it would 
raise doubts as to the instrumentality of the pragma-dialectical 
agenda as a whole. The reply: “Well, you have your definitions, 
I have mine” is not available because the pragma-dialectician 
needs a point of attack on the argumentative reality. She cannot, 
thus, completely ignore anomalies.  
On the other hand, and this is where the unfavorable po-
sition of the pancritical critic becomes apparent, the pragma-
dialectician can neither accept such claims as “falsifications” of 
the normative system. The “hard core” of the pragma-dialectical 
agenda is also protected. The protective belt in pragma-
dialectics is formed by the higher-order conditions. The idea of 
such conditions goes back to Barth and Krabbe (1982) and is 
developed in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 189) and 
van Eemeren (2015, pp. 835-839). These higher-order condi-
tions function as a protective belt because only if they are satis-
fied can a critic claim to have discovered an anomaly. Thus, 
with the rules themselves seen as first-order conditions, the se-
cond-order conditions “concern the internal states of arguers: 
their motivations to engage in critical discussion and their dis-
positional characteristics as to their ability to engage in critical 
discussion” (van Eemeren, 2015, p. 838). These second-order 
conditions assume “skill and competence” on the arguers’ part 
but also their “willingness” to follow the rules of reasonableness 
(2015, p. 838). On a yet higher level, the third-order conditions 
concern the “surrounding socio-political context of equality” in 
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which ideals such as “non-violence” and “freedom of speech” 
are accepted and lived by (2015, p. 838).  
A critique of Rule 1 cannot thus consist of a simple 
claim of the form “Aha! This piece of argumentative discourse 
is obviously unreasonable. And yet it is perfectly in line with 
Rule 1.” Had the first-order rules operated alone, such a discov-
ery might count as a weaker or stronger critique, depending in-
deed on the ‘obviousness’ of the discovered anomaly. But with 
the higher-order conditions in place, the critic still has an im-
mense burden of proof on her shoulders. She must additionally 
show that, in the situation at hand, the discussants were willing 
and able to be reasonable and that the socio-political context is 
such that the reasonableness was allowed and lived by. The most 
relentless of critics would shy away from such a challenge. And 
even if she does accept the challenge, it is not clear under what 
conditions her results would be acceptable. For how can it ever 
be established that individuals are truly willing and able to be 
reasonable? How can it ever be established that the context is 
truly one of freedom and equality? The critic’s task is made all 
but impossible. The hard core is protected and thus isolated, to 
some extent, from anomalies. 
One must therefore look for anomalies that circumvent, 
in one way or another, the higher-order conditions. Let me at-
tempt, for illustrative purposes, such an exercise. In each of the 
following three examples, an assumption regarding Rule 1 is 
confronted with an anomalous situation, that is, a situation that 
produces a tension between two parts of the pragma-dialectical 
evaluation procedure. 
 
Situation 1 
 
A first anomalous situation arises when a discussant taking part 
in an argumentative discussion prevents the other party from 
advancing an act that is itself unreasonable. We are led to the 
question: is it unreasonable to prevent someone from advancing 
a standpoint if the advancement of that standpoint is itself an 
unreasonable move? As we know, within the pragma-dialectical 
ideal, some standpoints can constitute fallacious forms of argu-
mentative behavior. Take for instance standpoints that suggest 
the other party has taken the opposite position when this is in 
fact not the case (violations of Rule 3 or straw men) or stand-
points whose formulation counts as an evasion of the burden of 
proof (violation of rule 2 or immunizations). What if the preven-
tive act prevents such standpoints? Will two wrongs make a 
right? It seems that the discussant is in a bind, with the rules 
offering no way out: If the prevention is successful, Rule 1 is 
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broken; if the prevention fails or if it does not occur, Rules 2 or 
3 are broken.  
This first example brings to surface a possible tension in 
simultaneously defining unreasonableness as a “violation of a 
rule” and as “the hampering of a procedure.” The two categories 
may coincide, and we might even assume that they typically do, 
but they need not. The tension is brought to surface by imagin-
ing a situation in which the violation of the rule does not hinder 
the resolution process but in fact safeguards it.  
The tension seems to suggest that the pragma-
dialectician cannot concurrently maintain the procedural and the 
prescriptive aspects of the rules for a critical discussion. If the 
rules stipulate how the resolution must be carried out, then eve-
rything depends on whether the procedure is maintained—
irrespective of whether, independently judged, a particular move 
violates a pre-defined norm. If the rules stipulate what moves 
are not to be carried out, then everything depends on whether 
the prohibited move is performed—irrespective of whether, 
judged in relation to the procedure, the move in question ham-
pers or safeguards the procedure.  
 
Situation 2 
 
Suppose we discover an act that fits all the requirements of a 
threat, including the fact that the perlocutionary intention is to 
have the other party desist from putting forward a standpoint or 
doubt. In short, imagine the perfect, most indisputable ad bacu-
lum. Can such an act be judged by the rules that govern the reso-
lution process?  
Of course, such an act will affect the resolution process 
and it allegedly does so in a bad way, but it seems that the 
speaker can always escape these allegations by showing that, by 
the very rules the evaluator is employing, such an act is not the 
kind that can occur in a resolution process. So, presumably, the 
discussants share an understanding that jokes, threats, coughs, 
yawns, miscommunications, asking for the time etc. are not to 
be seen as part of the resolution process even though they do 
constitute departures from that resolution process. They might 
be said to hinder the resolution process in an innocuous way. 
How can we then still judge the perfect ad baculum, which con-
sists of a threat—an act by definition not part of a critical dis-
cussion—by using the rules of a critical discussion? Isn’t the 
very perfection of the ad baculum a feature that sets it outside 
the resolution process and thus outside the jurisdiction of the 
rules for a critical discussion? 
 The second example brings to surface a possible tension 
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between the two implicitly separated categories of argumenta-
tive behavior that does not contribute to the resolution process: 
innocuous hindrances and fallacious hindrances. The tension is 
brought to surface by magnifying the concept of innocuous hin-
drances (yawns, coughs, scrambled turn-taking, irrelevant inter-
ventions etc.) so as to include fallacies. Given their non-
contribution to the resolution processes, the example suggests 
all fallacies are like yawns and fall outside the rules’ jurisdic-
tion. 
 
Situation 3 
 
A third and final example: If a fallacy “gets through” then the 
act by means of which the fallacy is committed must in some 
sense be accepted as an act. But this seems to suggest that it is 
ultimately the other party’s acceptance of the act that makes it 
fallacious. I am borrowing this idea from Jacobs and Jackson 
(2006). The authors, however, discuss it less as an anomaly 
within the pragma-dialectical system and more as a basis for an 
alternative account. They write: “Move and countermove are 
equally implicated in anything that goes wrong; together they 
make up flow. Derailment [fallaciousness] always occurs in at 
least two steps. A bad move of some sort is made and then, ra-
ther than taking corrective action of some sort, the move is al-
lowed to pass and to take effect” (p. 126). Although my discus-
sion seems in line with theirs, I am not sure to what extent Ja-
cobs and Jackson would agree to the consequences I draw from 
the observation that “it takes two to tango.”  
 Take again the case of the perfect ad baculum. If the 
abused party rejects the threat and puts forward her standpoint 
anyway, the resolution process is not derailed. The two can con-
sider that threat a slight pause in the resolution process (akin to a 
yawn) and can continue their discussion. It is only when the 
abused party accepts the threat and desists from advancing her 
standpoint on account of the threat that the fallacy occurs. But if 
this is the case, isn’t the abused party the one who is guilty of 
derailing the resolution process? And if this is the case for the 
ad baculum, isn’t it the case for all fallacies? In other words, can 
fallacies that “go through” not be seen as resulting from some 
inter-subjective “agreement” on the move’s admissibility? And 
if the parties inter-subjectively agree with it, isn’t this sufficient 
reason to assume the higher-order conditions are not met—in 
other words, isn’t this sufficient to assume that the discussants 
are not trying to follow the pragma-dialectical procedure for a 
critical discussion but some other ‘ethno-method’? It seems that 
the success of a fallacious move within a discussion creates the 
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paradoxical situation in which the scholar has good reasons not 
to apply the very standards by which that move can be judged 
fallacious. 
 Van Eemeren (2010) touches upon this last point when he 
notes, “a party that commits a fallacy in argumentative discourse 
might in principle still be regarded as upholding a general com-
mitment to reasonableness that involves an obligation to obey 
the rules for critical discussion” (p. 200). Van Eemeren makes a 
comparison with the Gricean Cooperation Principle, which is 
also upheld before violations. However, the two situations are 
completely different. The Gricean principle is upheld because 
the analyst is able to show that what appears to be a violation 
on the surface is not a violation after all—what appears to be 
miscommunication is in fact indirect communication. But in our 
example, the discussant’s fallacy is a fallacy and remains a fal-
lacy under evaluation.  
 The third example brings to surface a tension between 
characterizing fallacies as violations of rules and considering 
them felicitous speech acts. The tension is brought to surface by 
giving extra prominence to the role of the hearer in the felicitous 
performance of the fallacious act. In this way, fallacious acts 
appear, just as non-fallacious acts, to be in some sense admitted 
by both parties. And if the fallacious act “goes through” in this 
way (i.e., if the threat achieves its effect, if the unsound argu-
ment is accepted, if the shift in burden of proof is accepted etc.), 
then the evaluator has two good reasons to refrain from applying 
the rules, namely, both discussants contributed to the fallacious 
move in a way that suggests they are not playing the game of the 
critical discussion.  
 It is not my intention to suggest that these three anomalous 
situations, either separately or together, spell out crisis for the 
pragma-dialectical project. Their success as points of critique 
depends, as explained, on whether the description of the anoma-
lous situation offers ways out or compels the pragma-
dialectician to consider a revision of the ideal. It was rather my 
intention to illustrate the kind of exercise involved in a pancriti-
cal approach. In each case, the critic replicates the proposed 
evaluation procedure for situations that might give rise to proce-
dural glitches. The nature of the glitch—what counts as an 
anomaly and what is merely a quickly resolvable puzzle—is 
dependent on the tradition under study. In the case of Rule 1 of 
the pragma-dialectical code of conduct, three types of situations 
appeared to be anomalous: situations in which a piece of dis-
course is both unreasonable and necessary for maintaining the 
resolution process on track (example 1); situations in which a 
piece of discourse falls both within and outside the jurisdiction 
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of the rules (example 2); and situations in which the identifica-
tion of a certain fallacy (ad baculum) depends on the parties’ 
agreement on the move which constitutes the fallacy, an agree-
ment that seems to suggest the inapplicability of the rules in the 
case at hand (example 3).  
  
   
6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I took up Govier’s suggestion that argumentation 
scholars might have to reexamine the quest for an ideal of 
“good” argumentative discourse. This re-examination appeared 
necessary in view of the circularity created within idealist nor-
mative agendas, a circularity that is a “weak spot” given the 
scholars’ self-imposed aim of vindicating the primary and the 
secondary normative decisions, i.e., separating them from one’s 
personal preferences. By taking pragma-dialectics as a case in 
point, I have explained how the need to vindicate the primary 
and the secondary normative decision leads to circularity. I have 
then outlined and illustrated an alternative route, a form of criti-
cism that is not based on predefined ideals of “good” argumen-
tative discourse. Following Bartley (1984), I have referred to 
this as pancritical normativity. The essence of the pancritical 
view lies in the realization that “criticism” and “commitment” 
need not be fused. The other party’s commitments—together 
with an assumption that not anything goes, an assumption with-
out which normativity would be completely abandoned—form a 
sufficient basis for undertaking a search for anomalies. In such a 
view, criticism is understood as the finding of anomalies where 
the concept of “anomaly” is context-dependent and requires 
case-by-case judgment. I have then illustrated this search for 
anomalies with three brief examples.  
 This reexamination of the quest for ideals in argumenta-
tion theory has therefore led to a rejection of the question “What 
is a good argument?” This question begs an answer in the form 
of an ideal. If criticism and commitment to ideals are separated, 
the question to ask is “Under what conditions would this par-
ticular tradition of ‘good’ argumentative behavior run into trou-
ble?” Good forms of argumentative behavior and bad ones sepa-
rate themselves, in a variety of ways, within a multitude of tradi-
tions. The pancritical scholar admits to having absolutely no 
basis (or need) for carrying out this separation herself. But she 
acknowledges that not anything goes, so she maintains the nor-
mative stance. Her attention is then directed at the ideal of good 
argumentative discourse that is active within the tradition, and, 
with an understanding of what counts as an “anomaly” in that 
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particular tradition, proceeds to seek situations (in real-life or in 
imagination) that could be characterized as anomalous situa-
tions. Any discovered anomaly is a suggestion and an incentive 
to attempt a replacement of that tradition with a better one, a 
new tradition that is at least capable of “corroborating” the dis-
covered anomaly.  
 In this new understanding of criticism, the study of falla-
cies can be expected to grow in importance, albeit the nature of 
this study might change. This study will focus on fallacy accu-
sations as signals that a certain act has violated the norms of 
“good” argumentative behavior conventionalized within a cer-
tain tradition. If moral indignation is, as Merton put it, “a sign-
post announcing the violation of a social norm” (Merton, 1973, 
p. 292), then fallacy accusations, as forms of “argumentative 
indignation” are a signpost announcing the violation of norms of 
argumentative behavior. This introduces a significant degree of 
pluralism in the pancritical agenda. Fallacies do not “exist only 
in the mind of the interpreter” as Finocchiaro put it (1981, p. 
15), but they are also not universal categories of ‘bad’ argumen-
tative behavior. Fallacies are tradition-bound: they exist only as 
category-labels for what within a particular tradition is recog-
nized as “bad” argumentative behavior. A fallacy is akin to a lie: 
there is a sense in which everybody lies and a sense in which no 
two lies are the same. But these senses are determined only 
within and relative to concrete socio-historical traditions. We-
ber’s oft-quoted remark about moral ideals becomes particularly 
relevant: “the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are 
always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are 
just as sacred to others as ours are to us” (Weber, 1949, p. 57).  
Ideals of how one should behave in cases of conflict grow 
everywhere. Argumentation theorists follow a particular ideal, 
biologists follow another one, soccer players, jazz musicians, 
theologians and many other groups follow their own ideals. If 
there is something bringing these categories together it is the 
normative drive itself, the idea that not anything goes. Beyond 
this minimal agreement pro forma, there is a remarkable diversi-
ty of ideals, a diversity that cannot be tamed based on one unify-
ing standard. 
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